The Other Side of Peacekeeping: Peace Enforcement and Who Should Do It?

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> I therefore do not interpret any portion of the Panel's report [Brahimi Report] as a recommendation to turn the United Nations into a war-fighting machine or to fundamentally change the principles according to which peacekeepers use force.[1]
>
> *Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General*

On 6 October 1998 senior United Nations officials gathered in the grand General Assembly Hall for a Special Commemorative meeting of the General Assembly honoring 50 years of peacekeeping. Following a ceremonial presentation of the first Dag Hammarskjöld Medals to the families of the three distinguished UN peacekeepers who lost their lives in the pursuit of world peace, a session was conducted to assess the lessons of UN peacekeeping. Over 200 former and currently serving Special Representatives of the Secretary General, Force Commanders, and distinguished peacekeepers assembled to share their views. The real focus of the discussions was, however, on the lessons learned about peacekeeping from 1991 to 1998. These were the years that really define how UN peacekeeping is done today. One of the many revelations of the day was a general agreement that the United Nations cannot do

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1 K. Annan, *Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/55/502, 20 October 2000, p. 3, para. 7e. [Commonly referred to as the Implementing Report of the Brahimi Report]

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peace enforcement operations.[2] This raises the question, if the UN does not do international peace enforcement, then who does it?

Why did this session come to this conclusion? It was simple: they learned it the hard way, with the blood of far too many soldiers and civilians. The UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, said it best when he addressed the General Assembly on 6 October:

> Over the decades, we have had some unmistakable successes, such as Namibia, Mozambique, and El Salvador. But we have found ourselves maintaining calm in some seemingly intractable stalemates such as Cyprus and the Middle East. And in some places – Rwanda and former Yugoslavia – we have found ourselves standing by, in impotent horror, while the most appalling crimes were committed. There the limits of peacekeeping were graphically demonstrated: we learned, the hard way, that lightly armed troops in white vehicles and blue helmets are not the solution to every conflict. Sometimes peace has to made – or enforced – before it can be kept.[3]

There is no doubt that the UN is now performing what its founders outlined in the UN Charter. With 17 peacekeeping missions and 43,000 troops deployed from 88 nations in October 2002, the UN is answering the call to challenges of breaches of international security, but so are other organizations and nations. These include NATO's 70,000 peacekeepers in the Balkans (20,000 in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 50,000 in Kosovo) and two coalitions of the willing, the Multinational Observer Force in the Sinai with almost 2000 peacekeepers and the International Security and Assistance Force led by Turkey in Afghanistan with another 5000. This raises the question: why are other organizations conducting peacekeeping? The simple answer to this question is that consensus for the UN to conduct these missions could not be reached in the Security Council but, in reality, two of these missions (Kosovo and Afghanistan) are not peacekeeping but peace enforcement missions. They are high-risk operations very similar to the UN missions in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda the Secretary General described.

Although UN peacekeeping goes back 52 years, the lessons of today really began at the end of the Cold War. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, UN peacekeeping began to take on the challenges that were envisioned by the drafters of the UN Charter – "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war." As the Secretary General pointed out, there are many examples demonstrating that the nations of the world are getting better at handling complex peace operations. On the other hand, there are significant challenges associated with the UN executing peace enforcement

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2 Author was then the Military Advisor to the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, and participated in this discussion on 6 October 1998.

3 K. Annan, Statement before the Special Commemorative Meeting of the General Assembly Honoring 50 Years of Peacekeeping, 6 October 2000, from UN website, accessed on 26 November 2002.

operations. The responsibility of conducting peace enforcement operations should rest with a coalition of the willing, led by one nation, or a regional organization with an experienced and effective military arm. As Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, and most recently Afghanistan demonstrate, this principle is being learned through experience. It should be noted here, however, that peace enforcement operations undertaken by a coalition of the willing should have the legitimacy of a UN mandate. Peace enforcement operations, where there is limited or no consent of the parties, are very close to actual combat, with all that that implies. If the use of force or the threat of the use of force is the only way to compel the parties to resolve their differences peacefully, then a capable military organization is absolutely essential. It takes effective command and control, a refined decision-making process, and a well-trained and disciplined combat capable force to effectively carry out peace enforcement operations.

1. Origins of the Term Peace Enforcement

The meaning of the term peace enforcement is often misunderstood. Consider that when soldiers are performing enforcement actions under a UN Security Council mandate, they are still called peacekeepers. The term's origins are found in the UN Charter under Chapter VII and Articles 39, 41, and 42. Article 47 goes on to outline the procedures for managing "breaches of peace and acts of aggression". It establishes a Military Staff Committee to manage the armed forces placed at the disposal of the UN Security Council.[4] Unfortunately, the Member States that comprise the Military Staff Committee never came to an agreement on how the UN would use military forces placed at its disposal.[5]

Jane Boulden in her book, *Peace Enforcement: The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia,* provides an in-depth and excellent overview of peace enforcement operations. Her analysis focuses on the three missions listed in the title, but in the introduction she states that the impact of the Cold War prevented the Charter's intent of enforcement action from becoming a reality. With the end of the Cold War there was renewed optimism on the use of the UN's security arrangements.[6]

The first real use of the term peace enforcement came in Boutros Boutros Ghali's January 1992 Secretary General's report to the UN Security Council. The report,

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4 Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 June 1945, 22-26.

5 Author was the United States Representative to the Military Staff Committee from 1996-1999. The Military Staff Committee is comprised of the Military Advisors to the P5 Permanent Representatives to the United Nations (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States).

6 J. Boulden, *Peace Enforcement: The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2001), pp. 9-14.

more commonly know as *An Agenda for Peace,* outlined procedures for the use of "peace enforcement forces" by stating that Member States should place at the UN's disposal volunteers to manage broken or ineffective cease fires. He also stated that the forces must be more heavily armed than peacekeepers and undergo extensive preparatory training. Such forces would be under the command of the UN Secretary General.[7]

In his report, Boutros Boutros Ghali defines preventive diplomacy, peace making, peacekeeping, and post conflict peace building, but does not define peace enforcement. In his supplement to the *Agenda for Peace*, published in 1995, he further stated: "Even though the use of force is authorized under Chapter VII of the Charter, the United Nations remains neutral and impartial between warring parties…".[8] Later in the same supplement he stated:

> One of the achievements of the Charter of the United Nations was to empower the Organization [UN] to take enforcement action against those responsible for threats to the peace, breaches of peace or acts of aggression. Neither the Security Council nor the Secretary General at present has the capacity to deploy, direct, command and control operations for this purpose, except perhaps on a limited scale.[9]

A clear definition of peace enforcement did not emerge until the British and the American military doctrines on peacekeeping were published in 1994. Armies develop doctrine to guide the training of military forces, and in such documents, define terms. The US Army's Field Manual 100-23 of December 1994 defined preventive diplomacy and peace building along the lines described in *Agenda for Peace.* The manual also defined peace enforcement as, "the application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with generally accepted resolutions or sanctions."[10] The British field manual, *Wider Peacekeeping,* published in September 1994 defined peace enforcement as: "operations carried out to restore peace between belligerent parties who do not all consent to interventions and who may be engaged in combat activities".[11] The British manual also addressed consent of the warring or belligerent parties in some detail. Consent of the local parties is the critical difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

In August 2000, Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi submitted his report on the Panel of United Nations Peacekeeping (more commonly known as the Brahimi Report).

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7 B.B. Ghali, *Agenda for Peace,* 2nd edn. with Supplement and related UN documents (New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1995), pp. 56-57.

8 *Ibid*, p. 10.

9 *Ibid*, p. 28.

10 United States Army, *Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operation,* p. 6.

11 Director General Land Warfare, United Kingdom, *Army Field Manual Wider Peacekeeping,* pp. 1-2.

This report, done by an experienced panel of peacekeepers, was the most comprehensive review of UN peacekeeping done to date. The panel recommended: "that consent of the local parties, impartiality, and the use of force only in self defense should remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping".[12]

In this report Brahimi also only defined peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace building, but did not define peace enforcement. He goes on to describe spoilers and manipulation of the peace process. The report states: "In the past, the United Nations has often found itself unable to respond effectively to such challenges. It is a fundamental premise of the present report, however, that it must be able to do so". Brahimi later recommends that the mandate must authorize the use of force and those bigger, better-equipped forces, and more costly forces should be used to present a more credible deterrent threat. The Brahimi Report goes on. "Where enforcement action is required, it has consistently been entrusted to coalitions of willing States, with authorization of the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter".[13]

This brief review of the term peace enforcement does not clarify whether the UN should or should not do peace enforcement operations. It even muddies the water further. In fact, the Brahimi Report implies that the UN should develop the capacity to conduct peace enforcement. In some UN circles there are discussions about "robust peacekeeping." By this they mean providing UN forces with the necessary authority and capability, both size and combat equipment, to conduct enforcement actions. If one analyzes past missions, general trends emerge. The trend is regional organizations or coalitions of the willing are more suitable in conducting peace enforcement missions. Such actions support the Charter and the latest analyses on modern peace operations.

2. Historical Analysis

During the early days of the UN, Cold War tensions kept the UN from engaging in the more complex operations. With the exception of the 1960-1964 mission in the Congo, UN peacekeeping missions were what is now known as traditional peacekeeping.[14] When nations involved in a conflict needed a force to monitor a peace agreement, military units under the UN flag were the best method to ensure pure neutrality. A small interpositional force or unarmed observer force was deployed to monitor the peace and report and investigate violations. At the close of the Cold

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12 United Nations, *Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects and Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, pp. ix, 13. [This report is more commonly known as the Brahimi Report]

13 *Ibid*, pp. 13-14.

14 William J. Durch, *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p. 3.

War the UN became the preferred solution for all crises. Additionally, the explosion of information technology made the world more aware of wars around the globe. On several occasions, UN peacekeepers were asked to take on missions well beyond their capability. Somalia and the early days of Bosnia are good examples. These were essentially peace enforcement operations. Force size and capability were often limited during debates in the Security Council. More often than not, the force did not have the necessary combat power to be considered a credible deterrent force by the parties to the conflict.

Reduced Cold War competition and nations struggling to find their way in the postcolonial world created the conditions where more and more intrastate crises emerged. The international community and governments felt something needed to be done to stop the ethnic cleansing and human rights abuses associated with civil wars and intrastate strife. The UN was usually the best answer. UN peacekeepers were successful in Cambodia, El Salvador, Eastern Slavonia, Macedonia, Mozambique, and Guatemala, but struggled with missions in Bosnia, Somalia, Angola, and Sierra Leone. Other missions in Cyprus, Western Sahara, the Middle East, Georgia, Kuwait and Tajikistan lingered with no resolve, but no war either. Indeed, there is some merit to the argument that certain open-ended missions such as Cyprus are preferable to pulling "Blue Helmets" out and risking a greater crisis.

It was the missions in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda that caused those who attended the 50th Anniversary to say the UN could not do peace enforcement. Because of those difficult UN experiences when peace enforcement actions were required, a new form of multinational action emerged. In Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, East Timor, and most recently Afghanistan, coalitions of the willing, usually led by a single nation, came forward to ensure peace in these more complex operations. A new paradigm was created.

3. Somalia

In 1992, Somalia became center stage for world news. Images of thousands of people dying of starvation and disease were broadcast around the globe. Nations and individual citizens felt something needed to be done. The UN Security Council passed a resolution calling for the establishment of UNOSOM I. The mission was humanitarian in nature, but the challenge was beyond the UN's immature structure.[15] With no established government in Somalia, and a civil war raging around the peacekeepers, the force was too small and did not have enough resources to meet

15 Few know that in 1992, the Department of Peacekeeping Operation, the agency at the UN Headquarters responsible for managing peacekeeping, had just been formed. At this time, only eight people were in DPKO, and Kofi Annan was the head of this organization.

this challenge. The United States responded by sending in a force of over 28,000 troops to conduct the mission. To assist them 9,000 soldiers from 20 other countries also participated.[16] Responding initially with Marines, and then the 10th Mountain Division, the US-led force in Operation Restore Hope overcame the malady of the millions of starving people. Once the situation was relatively under control, the mission was handed back to the United Nations to provide a more long-term solution.

The United States remained engaged by providing a quick reaction force to the UN under a separate, not UN, command arrangement. In August 1993, in response to the ambush and killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers and other incidents of violence against UN forces, the United States deployed an elite force of US Army Rangers to find and detain those responsible for the attacks.[17] Command arrangements for all these forces were complicated and strained to say the least.[18] In October 1993, the US Ranger force attempted to capture the Somali warlord, Mohammed Farah Aideed. The mission went terribly wrong, and images of dead US soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu and the death of 18 American soldiers caused the United States to re-evaluate what it was doing in this failed nation. The end result was that the United States pulled out, and the UN was left to go it alone. Again, the challenges were insurmountable and beyond the organization's capability. Within a few months the UN was gone as well. This peace enforcement mission was the international communities' first post Cold War attempt to control a civil war. Many lessons were learned from this, but the most important one was that command and control of combat forces in peace enforcement operations must be clear and unambiguous. Somalia demonstrated the worst case of coordinating and controlling the use of force in peace enforcement missions.

4. UNPROFOR – Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Former Yugoslavia

As tensions rose in the former republics of Yugoslavia in 1991, the UN seemed to be the most likely organization to resolve this conflict. Again, there was no signed peace agreement and an unwillingness of the parties to the conflict to solve their differences peacefully. Regardless, the UN Security Council in Resolution 743 established the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR). Its task was to establish United Nations Protected Areas (UNPA), demilitarize these UNPAs, and protect persons

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16 *The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996* (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), p. 34.

17 *Ibid*, pp. 50-53.

18 K. Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* (Washington DC: National Defense University, 1995), p. 34.

residing in them from armed attack and human rights abuses.[19] Despite the initial deployment (April 1992) of almost 8,000 military personnel,[20] the civil war raged on with peaks and lulls in the fighting. In the course of three years (1992-1995) the UN Security Council passed 72 resolutions regarding the war in the former republics of Yugoslavia. UN forces continued to grow to meet the challenges of the mission. Thirteen times the mission was expanded and by November 1994 the military strength was 38,810.[21] The force was tasked to protect the delivery of humanitarian supplies and provide protection to civilians in the UN protection zones.

Negotiators tried to find a solution to the growing civil war, but were unsuccessful. Finally, under the pressure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), whose nations provided the bulk of the UN force, a plan was developed where a UN force commander could call for NATO air attacks to force the Serbs to back down on their attacks against Bosnian Muslims. This was a heavily debated issue. The final result was a dual key approach. Both NATO and the UN had to agree before aircraft could be launched. When the time came, there was a fundamental disagreement on the targets to strike, and the action failed to have its intended effect.[22] The delayed decision process resulted in targets fleeing or changing locations, thus attacks were not effective in deterring the Serb military.

The end of the UNPROFOR came in July 1995 in the safe area of Srebrenica. The Serb Army surrounded and captured a Dutch Battalion. Hereto, disagreement on the use of NATO air delayed and marginalized the impact on the use of force. The Dutch Battalion was forced to leave the area. The Serbs corralled the civilians into a soccer stadium and separated the men from their families. A few escaped to tell of the over 7,000 that perished in a nearby factory.[23] This event led to more intense diplomatic efforts.

By December 1995, a hard fought peace agreement was brokered in Dayton, Ohio. The Dayton Accords were complicated and tenuous at best. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and approved by the Security Council, NATO and many other non-NATO countries deployed 60,000 troops to conduct peace enforcement. NATO's highly effective and combined headquarters worked for years perfecting its planning and decision-making apparatus. The military force was well trained, and the bulk of the force came from the best-trained armies in the world. Armed with tanks, attack

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19 UN website, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko.dpko/co_mission/unprofor_p.htm, accessed 22 November 2002.

20 *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping,* 3rd edn., (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), p. 514.

21 UN website, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko.dpko/co_mission/unprofor_p.htm, accessed 22 November 2002, pp. 1-44.

22 D.P. Bolger, *Savage Peace, Americans at War in the 1990s* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995), pp. 357-359.

23 UN Secretary General's Report, *The Fall of Srebrenica*, A/54/549, 15 November 1999, pp. 69-70, 90. [Author highly recommends this be read – a very honest and eye-opening report]

helicopters and all the elements needed to fight a war, NATO came prepared to solve this problem once and for all. The effective combat force deterred further outbreaks of violence and brought peace to the region. As of November 2002, the military force in Bosnia is still over 20,000 troops, but the mission has devolved to peacekeeping rather than the more risky peace enforcement.

In retrospect, the international community was convinced that the UN was the right organization to conduct a peace enforcement mission to end the civil war erupting in the former republics of Yugoslavia. However, over the course of three years the mission did not have its intended affect. Despite continued expansions of the UN force and the authorization by the Security Council to use "all necessary measures" under Chapter VII of the Charter, the UN force never accomplished what it was sent to do – set the conditions to stop the civil war. Even when the employment of attack aircraft was approved, the decision to use it became a political decision and, in the end, was not effective.

5. Rwanda

Probably the lowest point in the entire history of UN peacekeeping came in 1994. Following the Arusha Peace Agreement, a small UN force was deployed to Rwanda to assist in the monitoring of the peace agreement. On 6 April 1994 the plane carrying the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi was shot down.[24] This was the signal for a planned mayhem where marauding bands of militia singled out people and brutally murdered them – many by machetes. The UN Security Council tried to find a solution, but the Council was deadlocked. The Council realized the UN did not have the capability to deploy a force rapidly, and no nation was willing to send in its troops to solve an internal conflict.[25] The Organization of African Unity, the regional organization closest to the issue, did not have a military capability or a planning staff, and neither did any other nearby nation.

Over 800,000 people were violently killed in this ethnic war before an international force could stop the killing. The UN peacekeepers on the ground were helpless, and ten Belgian peacekeepers were tortured and murdered trying to protect the Prime Minister. Peacekeepers did what they thought was right, but the force was too small and did not have the Security Council's authority to take action.[26] This was another lesson learned the hard way. Secretary General Kofi Annan felt per-

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24 *Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda*, from UN web site, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/rwanda.htm, 15 December 1999, UN Headquarters, New York, New York, p. 50.

25 *Ibid*, pp. 9-20.

26 *Ibid*, pp. 14-16, 50.

sonally responsible for the genocide, but in reality the blame should go to the nations of the world. The Security Council was left with few options. The UN was incapable of responding rapidly, and the Organization of African Unity had no capability to act. Lastly, no nation was willing to step forward. The task would have required immediate deployment of a relatively large force with the combat capability to conduct operations under Chapter VII (peace enforcement). Finally the French responded in Operation Turquoise, but the response was too late. At the opening session of the 1999 General Assembly, Secretary General Kofi Annan stood before the assembled heads of State and declared that the world should never allow another genocide like Rwanda.[27]

6. Haiti

In 1993 and 1994 the US experienced the political unrest in Haiti first hand. Numerous boats filled with people tried to leave their troubled homeland. After the ship, USS Harlan County, was turned back in October 1993 carrying a small UN monitoring mission to assist in the Governor's Island Agreement, unrest and turmoil escalated. American Coast Guard cutters picked up hundreds of fleeing refugees and whisked them off to a US run refugee camp at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.[28] As the situation came to a head in September, the Security Council authorized a multinational force under Chapter VII,[29] and the US was willing to take the lead role. On 17 September 1994, a negotiating team, headed by former US President Jimmy Carter, met with General Cedras, the self appointed military head of the country. At 4:00 p.m., negotiations were progressing, but no agreement had been reached. General Phillippe Biamby, the number two in the Haitian military, came into the room and informed Cedras that the 82nd Airborne, America's most elite fighting force, was preparing to invade the island.[30] The US was willing to solve this crisis forcefully if it could not be solved diplomatically. Cedras conceded. The US military altered its plans, in mid steam, and executed Operation Uphold Democracy. By the end of the day a smaller, yet very capable force of almost 6,000 soldiers was on the ground all over Haiti. Within a few days General Cedras and a few staff were escorted out of the country. The headquarters and decision-making authority of the force rested with the United States' contingent, but CARICOM, a Caribbean regional organization, and 20 other nations helped round out the multinational force. As law and order were

27 UN website, http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/Report99/intro99.htm, accessed 30 November 2002.

28 United States Atlantic Command, "Operation Uphold Democracy: US Forces in Haiti," developed by OC, Incorporated, undated, p. 2.

29 Security Council Resolution 940, S/RES/940, 31 July 1994.

30 R.A. Pastor, "More and Less Than It Seemed", in: Crocker, Hampson, Aall (Eds.), *Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World*, (Washington DC: Institute of Peace Press, 1999), p. 518.

restored and the Haitian military was neutralized, President Aristide, the duly elected president, came forward to assume leadership of the country. As one US Brigade Commander assessed the initial operation: "We arrived in Haiti with more than enough combat force …. The overwhelming show of force guaranteed that there would be little or no resistance from the military junta."[31] Six months later with security conditions much improved the US led force transitioned to a UN run peacekeeping mission.[32] This mission established a model for others to follow – a lead nation taking charge of the peace enforcement role, under a UN mandate, followed by a United Nations peacekeeping operation.

7. Kosovo

Several years later, unfinished business in the Balkan region erupted in Kosovo. President Slobodan Milosevic, President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, wanted to regain control over the historic Serbian province. The majority of the people in the region were ethnic Albanians. Albanian freedom fighters wanted an independent country, and Milosevic was determined to reassert his control. Throughout 1998 and 1999, Milosevic carried out a campaign to cleanse Kosovo of all Albanians. The world again witnessed the ethnic cleansing in living color. With Rwanda still in the minds of world leaders, something needed to be done. Human rights were being abused and action was necessary. US envoy Richard Holbrooke and other world leaders tried in vain to negotiate with Milosevic. Although he initially agreed to international demands and permitted the deployment of an Organization for the Security and Cooperation of Europe observer mission, Milosevic continued his campaign against the Kosovar Albanians.[33]

The only alternative was to use force. This time, NATO took the lead and conducted a massive air campaign to force the Serbs back to the bargaining table. The Yugoslav people and leadership demonstrated enormous stamina. Most political decision makers felt the Serbs would give in to NATO's demands in a few days, but the air campaign lasted 78 days. In the final days of the air war there was considerable debate on who would administer the province of Kosovo. NATO was willing to do it, but Russia was uncomfortable with NATO being responsible for everything. The UN had to play a role. Finally an agreement was reached. Milosevic would move his forces out of Kosovo; the UN would administer the province, while NATO troops would provide security. UN Security Council Resolution 1244 author-

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31 L.E. Casper, *Falcon Brigade: Combat and Command in Somalia and Haiti* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2001), p. 250.

32 United States Atlantic Command, pp. 51-52.

33 W.K. Clark, *Waging Modern War* (New York: Public AffairsTM, 2001), pp. 138-139 and 150-158.

ized under Chapter VII, a peace enforcement force comprised of 40,000 NATO and other non-NATO troops.[34] Their mission was to make sure the Serb military and national police lived up to the agreements. The UN, assisted by several European regional organizations, began preparations to be the transitional administrator. This mission was a new role for the UN – total control of a region. The Secretariat had some experience in this type of mission, but not to the magnitude it faced in Kosovo.[35]

As of November 2002, there are still over 40,000 NATO troops in Kosovo and another 10,000 outside Kosovo keeping the peace, while the United Nations is coordinating the many facets of nation building.[36] The synchronized efforts of the European Union (EU), the Organization for the Security and Cooperation of Europe (OSCE), and the UN are making considerable progress. In this case a very capable regional organization is conducting the peace enforcement role, while the UN with the help of other regional organizations, rebuilds the nation.

8. East Timor

As the new millennium approached in another part of the world the status of East Timor became an issue. Since 1975, East Timor, a former Portuguese colony, had been administered by Indonesia. President Habibie of Indonesia felt it was time to find a final solution. The people of East Timor would be given the opportunity to determine their own destiny – independence or remain a part of Indonesia. The situation was precarious. Many Indonesian Muslims controlled much of the property in East Timor, and the predominately Catholic East Timorese had never been given much authority in administering their territory. In March 1999, Portugal, Indonesia and the UN signed an agreement that called for the UN to conduct a referendum so the people of East Timor could determine their future. Tensions were high, and the neighboring country of Australia knew it. While the UN worked out the details for the referendum, Australia sent a team to the UN Headquarters in New York to lay out the options of what might happen and recommendations on how to deal with the situation.[37]

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34 W.G. O'Neil, *Kosovo: An Unfinished Peace* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2002), p. 15.

35 The UN gained some experience in the challenges of running a country in the Congo (1960s) and Eastern Slavonia (1995-1999).

36 NATO website, http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/about.htm, accessed 30 November 2002.

37 Author was at the UN in March 1999 when Brigadier Mike Smith from Australia presented the options available to the United Nations for handling the situation in East Timor. Australia was willing to take the lead, but wanted the approval of the UN. The options included: actions leading up to the referendum, a prediction that the people would vote for independence, and actions following the referendum.

The Australians' predictions were exactly right. When the UN Secretary General announced in September 1999 that the people voted overwhelmingly for independence, violence broke out and what little the country had was destroyed. The UN Security Council immediately passed Resolution 1264 on 15 September 1999, authorizing a multinational peace enforcement force under Chapter VII. Australia took the lead, and on 20 September, the operation commenced with a force of 11,500 soldiers from 22 countries.[38] The force quickly spread out across the island, but not before pro Indonesian militia destroyed much of Dili. As an added precaution, the United States positioned the USS Belleau Wood, a large deck amphibious ship complete with a Marine expeditionary force, off shore. It provided a much needed show of force.[39] According to General Cosgrove, the INTERFET Commander:

> Our experience in East Timor is enlightening. We found there in that peace making, not peace keeping, role that forces structured and equipped, ready if necessary, for war were actually very effective… A force optimized for peace keeping would have, in my view, invited more adventurist behavior by our adversaries. A quick relatively bloodless success is always preferred to the alternative, even if some might see the background investment and particular cost for force structure reasons, expensive in dollar terms.[40]

By October 1999, the Security Council felt that the mission could be transferred to a UN force, so UN Security Council Resolution 1272, established the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor. By March 2000, the violence was under control, and the mission was turned over to the United Nations. In the course of two years, the UN was able to hold elections, reestablish governance, education, and a functioning society. On 19 May 2002 Timor Leste celebrated its independence as Secretary General Kofi Annan handed over responsibility to the newly elected President Xanana Gusmao.[41] Tensions still exist, but the Security Council reduced the size of the UN military presence to 5,000 military personnel and 1,240 civilian police.[42]

9. A New Model for Peace Operations

What has emerged in recent years is a new model to handle the full spectrum of peace operations in failed states (Figure 1). Lead nations or effective regional organizations carry out the difficult, combat-oriented task of peace enforcement while the UN is the best organization to handle peacekeeping. Once the peace enforcement

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38 Gen. P. Cosgrove, ANZAC Lecture, Georgetown University, 4 April 2000.
39 US Force INTERFET, "Operation Stabilise, After Action Report", 11 February 2000, pp. 6-7.
40 Gen. P. Cosgrove, ANZAC Lecture.
41 BBC website, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1996673.stm, accessed 30 November 2002.
42 UN website, http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2002/sc2002.htm, accessed 30 November 2002.

force has the situation relatively stabilized and an effective peace agreement in place, the mission can be transferred to the UN. During the transition of power from a lead nation or regional organization, the UN conducts detailed integrated planning with the peace enforcement force and establishes an effective transition plan. This is what happened in Haiti and East Timor.



Figure 1
Model of a peace enforcement mission transitioning to a peacekeeping mission.

An important point to note is the UN Security Council must authorize a lead nation or regional organization to conduct the peace enforcement operation. This authorization adds legitimacy and credibility to the operation. In fact, Article 53 of the UN Charter states: "no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council".[43] Haiti and East Timor are examples of such an authorization. Amidst the "realpolitik" of the UN system, however, it is not always possible to gain UN Security Council approval for a regional organization to conduct a peace enforcement operation. Such was the case for the Kosovo air war in March 1999. There were fundamental differences of opinion among the permanent five members of the Council, yet something needed to be done quickly, and NATO had the authority and power to do it. Consequently, for the greater good of protecting thousands of abused people, NATO went forward with its air war despite not having UN Security Council approval. It is quite possible that a regional organization will understand the issues and necessity of military action better than the Security Council. Consequently when regional

43 UN Charter, p. 29.

security is threatened, a regional organization may have to make a decision when the UN Security Council is deadlocked. A lead nation, however, should not undertake such an operation without the approval of a regional organization or the UN. If it did, some would see that nation as the aggressor not the protector.

This model seems simple, but in reality there are a lot of gray areas. Traditional low threat peacekeeping has always been the role of the UN. As for peace enforcement, in its purest sense, Chapter VII operations like Operation Desert Storm clearly fall to a lead nation or capable regional organization. In between the two is the gray area. Some UN Security Council resolutions authorize UN peacekeepers "to take all necessary measures" to conduct the operation, or specifically state "under Chapter VII." The tricky part is to determine when to use a lead nation or regional organization and when to call for a UN peacekeeping force. This requires a good mission analysis and effective planning. The two critical factors that will determine what kind of force to use are consent and risk to peacekeepers.

Consent is often difficult to measure. The fact that parties to the conflict sign a peace agreement is not sufficient to determine consent. In some cases leaders sign agreements, but the population is not committed to it. If the people have the will and capability to resist the peace process, they will. When this happens, there is likely to be unrest and violence. In other cases, the fact that the paper was signed has relatively no meaning to the leader who signed it. He or she may sign the peace agreement only to buy time to refit the military for the next campaign. Boutros Boutros Ghali recognized this in his *Agenda for Peace* when he discussed the use of peace enforcement forces to handle "cease fires that have been agreed to but not complied with".[44]

If consent of the parties is determined to be low and the parties to the conflict have the capability to continue fighting, then the risk to peacekeepers will be high. In this case, a capable military structure (coalition of the willing under a lead nation or a regional organization) is the only way to effectively conduct peace enforcement operations. The use of force may be the determining factor that brings about peace. The following diagram (Figure 2) outlines this challenge pictorially. On the vertical axis is the consent of the parties to allow the presence of an international force. On the horizontal axis is risk and the size and capability of the force needed to conduct the mission. If the risk is high and consent of the parties is low, then a large military force with robust combat capabilities is essential.

There are many reasons why the UN cannot and should not conduct peace enforcement operations. First, the very essence of the UN Charter is peaceful in nature. In fact, the Brahimi report states: "use of force in only self-defense should remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping".[45] Peace enforcement operations

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44 B.B. Ghali, p. 56.

45 Brahimi report, p. 9.

call for the use of force or the threat of force to compel the parties to the conflict to solve their differences peacefully. Should the mere presence of a robust, combat-capable force not stop the violence, the use of force may be necessary. Some nations who volunteer their forces for UN duty do not allow the military to participate in Chapter VII operations. Secondly, since peace enforcement operations are close to combat operations, it takes an effective, well-trained military force to manage the violence of military power. The use of force also requires an effective decision-making apparatus.



Figure 2

The UN is encumbered by a slow decision making body – the Security Council, and when entrusted, the Secretary General or Special Representative. If, based on agreements, the Special Representative has the authority to use force; some nations may balk to gain time for national level decision-makers to consider the situation. This severely limits a UN force commander's ability to solve the problem quickly. Such a situation occurred in Sierra Leone when subordinate UN commanders refused the orders of the Force Commander.[46] The decision to use force must be swift and definitive. Any delay in the decision process could be catastrophic.

Regional forces or a multinational coalition organized around a lead nation will be better equipped to handle these types of situations. First, they are used to working with each other. Secondly, the decision process to use force usually rests in a single national chain. Lastly, when the use of force is anticipated, senior military leaders

46 A. Bullion, "India in Sierra Leone: A Case for Muscular Peacekeeping?", *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Winter), 2001, pp. 78, 81.

always plan for the use of a reserve force, an extra combat force that can rapidly move within the conflict area to respond to threats. All military leaders understand the importance of reserve forces – a concept unheard of in UN operations. Should the situation escalate, a reserve force properly employed might prove the difference of success or failure. Whether the reserve is composed of additional ground forces or combat aircraft, the requirement to make this decision and employ the force rapidly is critical. When NATO air was approved for use in Bosnia in 1994 and 1995 to protect civilians, the cumbersome decision making arrangement delayed the use of force and negated its effectiveness.

Since 1998 the UN has had a peacekeeping force in Sierra Leone. In the conduct of this mission, the UN ran into many obstacles or spoilers to the peace process. Essentially, Sierra Leone is, and was, a peace enforcement mission. Regularly, UN forces were attacked and the risk to peacekeepers was high. In managing this force the Security Council and the Secretariat were again challenged by the limitations of a UN force – a small lightly-armed force incapable of enforcing setbacks to the peace process, a politically oriented decision-making authority, members of the peacekeeping force who were not inclined to use force even though it was authorized, and an ineffective command and control structure. To meet this challenge the UN Secretariat called for a larger force. In Resolution 1313 of 4 August 2000, the Security Council condemned the armed attacks and detention of UN personnel and considered these actions serious violations of the Lome Peace Agreement. In the same resolution, the Council strengthened the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).[47]

By late 2000, even though there was a signed peace agreement, it was not worth the paper it was written on. Cease-fire violations occurred regularly. There was little consent for peace, so why did the UN peacekeepers stay? The reason is simple. Africa has very limited regional capabilities to manage conflicts. Although ECOMOG, the military arm of ECOWAS, provided considerable military support to the crisis, the situation only improved marginally. It took continued political pressure by the UN with a relatively large (17,400) peacekeeping force under a Chapter VII mandate, and the support provided by the British army to create the conditions for a possible success. Although it is too early to call the UN mission in Sierra Leone a success, Refugees International published a report in October 2002 saying the crisis in Sierra Leone is making great progress, but it was the commitment of British, both inside the UN structure and its bilateral arrangement with the Government of Sierra Leone, that gave the necessary strength for the mission to succeed.[48] It can be argued that

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47 Security Council Resolution 1313, S/RES/1313, 4 August 2000.

48 C. Bernath and S. Nyce, "UNAMSIL – A Peacekeeping Success, Lessons Learned", *Refugees International*, (October), 2002, p. 17. [Website: http://www.refugeesinternational.org/files/newsletters/RIUNAMSIL.pdf].

had a capable enforcement force gone to Sierra Leone when the crisis first erupted, many lives would have been saved and many human rights abuses would have been averted.

What about Afghanistan? Following the US-led air campaign to destroy the Al Qaeda terrorist group, there was a call for peacekeeping forces to provide security for the fledgling new government. Ambassador Brahimi, who at this time was the Secretary General's Special Representative to Afghanistan, was quick to state the UN would not provide an UN-run peacekeeping force. This indicated that the UN Secretary General and certainly Ambassador Brahimi assessed the security situation in Afghanistan as extremely tenuous. That is why the Secretary General recommended, and the Security Council approved, the creation of an International Security and Assistance Force in Afghanistan. With a war ongoing against Al Qaeda, the best decision was a coalition of the willing acting under Chapter VII with UN Security Council authorization.[49] This force must be capable of applying military combat power should the situation warrant it. Thankfully, the United Kingdom stepped forward to be the initial lead nation, and Turkey followed suit to replace them in June 2002. In March of 2002, the Security Council in Resolution 1401 approved the creation of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). UNAMA's tasks, as outlined in the accompanying Secretary General's report, indicate it has a peace building focus.[50] In the future, should the security situation improve, and international presence is still required, maybe a UN peacekeeping force can be employed? – much like what was done in Haiti and East Timor. The security situation must, however, improve.

10. Summary

The last century, the bloodiest ever, re-emphasized the destructiveness of war – whether they are large or small. With the threat of global war much diminished, small-scale wars rage on. These brutal wars are affecting huge populations. Ironically, the end of the Cold War has given way to greater regional instability. Additionally the rise of global information makes us more aware of suffering people caused by these conflicts. With this increased awareness, people will call for their governments, regional organizations, and the United Nations to find solutions. As these international decision-makers wrestle with what needs to be done, they must make a thorough assessment of the situation, and make the right decision. The critical factor in determining what needs to be done is to analyze the willingness of the parties to the

49 Security Council Resolution 1386, approved on 20 December 2001.

50 United Nations, *The Situation in Afghanistan and Implications for International Peace and Security, Report of the Secretary General*, A/56/875-S/2002/278, 18 March 2002, pp. 15-16.

dispute to resolve their differences peacefully. If that consent is relatively high, a United Nations peacekeeping force is probably the right answer. If the consent is at all questionable, and there is a definite need to intervene to protect innocent civilians, then a coalition of the willing, authorized by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter, should be employed.

Regional organizations and nations with the capability to respond to challenges to world peace have a clear and challenging responsibility to prepare for the next call. Regional organizations need to improve their capability to manage peace enforcement operations and nations, with the will and the ability, need to seriously consider committing military forces to places outside their sphere of interest.

There are only a few regional organizations around the world involved in peace operations (NATO, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and South African Development Council (SADC)), yet there are many organizations that could be used to help in a time of crisis. Some regional organizations were formed for collective security reasons, others for trade and development. For whatever reason, they have a common interest and a process for making decisions. When a crisis erupts in their region, they generally have collective concerns and interests. It behooves all these organizations to explore their roles and responsibilities when faced with breaches of international security. This needs to be done before a crisis occurs. Often, in an attempt to "do the right thing", plans are thrown together to meet a need. (OSCE never envisioned it would organize a monitoring force for the crisis in Kosovo.) Most organizations do not have effective planning capabilities and command and control structures. For years many countries have been encouraging the then Organization of African Unity and now African Union to develop a capability to manage and handle the crises on the African continent.

Peace enforcement operations are close to war and it takes a well-trained, well-equipped military organization to force peace when the parties to the conflict are intent on prosecuting a war, especially when there are many victimized civilians. There is no doubt that crises will continue to erupt in this new world [dis]order of the 21st century. As responsible citizens of the world, we must find solutions to help those who confront the scourge of war. The decision to use force to end a war or protect innocent civilians is not an easy one. Political leaders will always find this to be one of the most difficult decisions of their careers. Choosing the right organization and the right force for the job is critical. History is replete with examples of both doing it right and doing it wrong. We must learn from these experiences, as the next decision is right around the corner.